This paper examines the interaction between constitutional design and practice through a case study of Canadian federalism. Focusing on the federal architecture of the Canadian Constitution, the paper examines how subnational units in Canada actually compete with the central government, emphasizing the concrete strategies and tactics they most commonly employ to get their way in confrontations with central authority. The evidence affirms that constitutional design and structure make an important difference in the tactics and tools available to subnational units in a federal system, but that design is not fully constraining: there is considerable evidence of extraconstitutional innovation and improvisation by governments. Furthermore, changes in practice initiated by Canadian subnational actors have produced changes in the allocation of national and subnational authority that are plausibly characterized as constitutional in magnitude. The paper concludes that the design of the Canadian federal system may inadvertently undermine its capacity to stabilize itself at any particular point of constitutional evolution, making it 'permanently provisional.'
Introduction
In the classic model of constitutionalism, a constitution is understood to be a permanent article of positive law containing a set of fixed instructions issued by a popular sovereign to its governmental agents. To ensure that constitutional commands issue only from the popular sovereign -to prevent the people's agents from changing their own instructions -constitutions are deliberately 'entrenched.' That is, the constitution is rendered presumptively permanent by making it difficult to change, and by ensuring that the people remain the sole ultimate source of amending authority. This largely static model comports well with the philosophical premises of contractarianism, which holds that political legitimacy is founded on the consent of the governed (Locke 1690), and thus tends to conceive of a constitution as fixed and permanent -'established in its entirety at a definite time and place' (Griffin 1996 (Griffin : 2124 , at the moment in which consent was granted.
In sharp contrast, the constitutions of federal states are almost universally viewed as dynamic and continually evolving. Among those who study federalism, there is remarkable consensus on this point. ' [F] to Benz and Broschek (2013: 2) , 'federal systems are permanently in motion.' Most same time, other power holders will have an equally predictable propensity to defend their own domains against encroachment. Such a system is highly dynamic; it creates a kind of permanent contestation among holders of official power. If the system works well, constitutional limitations on government power are entrenched by maintenance of a dynamic equilibrium at the desired design parameters (Schwartz 1989: 35; Ordeshook 1993: 204) .
Federalism is such a system. By definition, a federal constitution (1) creates a national government; (2) recognizes the permanence and autonomy of subnational units; and (3) allocates to each level some measure of power (Elazar 1966) . The existence and authority of the two orders of government is then made permanent through entrenchment: the federal plan 'freezes a particular allocation of authority between provinces and the center' (Levy 2014: 345) . This end is achieved, however, not simply through an initial textual allocation of competencies followed by an expectation of obedience -through the creation, that is, of parchment barriers. In the Madisonian model, each level of government is endowed with powers sufficient to allow it monitor and check the abuses of the other: 'The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself ' (Madison 1787 -1788 ). Thus, the stability of the constitutional plan depends upon the capacity of each order of government to 'control' -or at least to influence and obstruct -the other. To accomplish this end, the amount of power allocated to each level of government and the reach of its authority presumably must be calibrated with some precision; an imbalance in either direction could lead to a risky accumulation of power at the national or subnational level -the very result that federalism is instituted to preclude. Thus, constitutional designers carry a heavy burden: they must carefully plot out and entrench, as the U.S. Supreme Court has said in a comparable context, a 'finely wrought and exhaustively considered' division of power I that will permit national and subnational governments to fight each other to a permanent draw.
What Madison did not and could not know, however, was that the dynamic, contestatory system he contemplated does not fully solve the problem of constitutional entrenchment due to the phenomenon of informal constitutional change. One of the most common drivers of informal constitutional change is alteration by government officials of the practices they employ in the discharge of their official duties. As Behnke and Benz ' In Denning's (1997: 211) formulation, these kinds of actions may properly be understood as 'claims of power' that constitute '"moves" made by the "legislative and executive branches . . . that serve as precedents for future actions."' II The establishment of precedents permitting government authority to be exercised in new ways in turn can alter the substance of the constitution's grants of authority to the actors who establish these precedents. In other words, constitutional actors can alter their own power by changing how and when they exercise it, thus initiating change in the substance of the constitutional allocation of power (Gardner 2016: 353-364) .
If static methods of constitutional entrenchment are vulnerable to the problem of 'parchment barriers,' this analysis suggests that dynamic systems of constitutional entrenchment may be vulnerable to what we might call the problem of 'plastic barriers.'
That is, in a dynamic system, constitutional instructions may not be overtly repudiated or ignored, but may instead undergo alteration or evolution as holders of government power constantly probe for advantage in a permanent contest over public policy.
The problem of plastic constitutional barriers is clearly presented in constitutional systems of federalism. Federalism is by nature a contestatory system in which it is anticipated that national and subnational governments will contend to secure influence and advantage (Bednar 2009: 63-85) . As a result, the elements of informal constitutional change are necessarily present. First, the tools constitutional actors possess to deploy against other actors in contests over authority are by definition the tools of official practice. To the extent that the duties of officials at each level of government include monitoring and, when necessary, deploying power against the other level of government, the form that such resistance takes is inherently a mode of official practice. Second, a constitutional regime that furnishes government officials with incentives to struggle against one another provides them with incentives to prevail not merely by deploying the tools of incursion and selfdefense that the constitution uncontroversially provides, but also to compete by changing the constitutional ground rules so as to develop and deploy more effective tools of contestation (Levinson 2011).
The institutionalization of intergovernmental contestation thus has the potential to place great pressure on the stability of federal regimes. 'The incentive to deviate from the division of authority, ' argues Jenna Bednar (2009: 63) , 'is inescapably built in to the federal In short, a constitutional regime that institutionalizes contestation among officials is a regime that invites unforeseeable alteration of the very aspects of the constitutional regime that contestation is meant to stabilize -the constitutional allocation of authority. Through the process of intergovernmental contestation, the location of the boundary between national and subnational authority may shift, initially as a matter of contingent fact, and eventually as a matter of constitutional reformation. Contestatory federalism, then, is a constitutional structure that seems to invite change, not only in the palette of tools and techniques that national and subnational governments deploy against one another, but also, over time, in the substantive allocation of authority among the two orders of government.
If I am correct to this point, the relevant question of constitutional design in federal states is quite different from the one that occupied Madison. My claim is that the mechanism of intergovernmental contestation deployed by federalism to stabilize constitutional allocations of power is capable simultaneously of destabilizing those very allocations; federalism, in other words, is inherently a system with the capacity to destabilize itself. If so, then a different question arises: might some federal constitutional arrangements be more stable than others? Might they incur less risk of variation from the desired distribution of competencies, and thus endure longer? This is not an idle inquiry: by one count, 27 of the 44 federations formed in the last two hundred years have failed either by breaking apart or by collapsing into a unitary state (Lemco 1991: 1) . Especially in modern, ethnonational federations, maintenance of a particular allocation of authority between national and subnational governments is often a critical term of the basic constitutional bargain upon which the legitimacy of the state is founded.
The balance of this paper explores these questions through a case study of the Canadian Constitution. It begins with an overview of the Canadian Constitution, focusing E -8 on the allocation of power between the national government and the provinces contemplated by the constitutional design. It then moves on to examine how federalism is actually practiced in Canada, primarily by analyzing the tools and tactics deployed by Canadian provinces in moments of conflict with the central state. It also looks at the consequences of these tactics for the constitutional allocation of power. The paper concludes with some reflections on the relation between the Canadian Constitution's federal design and the stability over time of the constitutional division of authority.
A case study: Canadian federalism

The structure of Canadian federalism
In a celebrated double irony of unintended consequences, the Constitution of Canada was written for the express purpose of making the structure of Canadian government as different as possible from that of the United States. In this, the designers of the document succeeded, but not in a way they foresaw. (c)). Simultaneously, the United States Constitution evolved from its original design as the charter of a decentralized state with a weak central government to something that is, for many purposes and in many circumstances, very close to its polar opposite. Neither set of drafters, then, obtained what they wanted, and one of the main differences between the two constitutional cultures today is that the fact of constitutional evolution is obvious to and often welcomed by Canadians, whereas it is sometimes denied, and often regretted, by Americans.
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The structure of Canadian federalism is complex, and needs to be described in some detail. This section begins by describing the formal features established by the Canadian Constitution, and then moves on to describe the many informal institutions and practices that overlie the constitutional structure and account for the characteristic institutions of Canadian federalism.
The formal federal structure
The current constitution of Canada was enacted in 1982 by the British Imperial Parliament at Canadian request, and effected the 'patriation' of the constitution, the most significant step in a long and gradual -but still incomplete -process of Canadian disengagement from the British Empire and corresponding assumption of self-sovereignty. 
36(2)).'
The fiscal capacity of the provinces varies dramatically, and equalization payments by the federal government help smooth out inequalities in the ability of each province to provide its citizens with the kind of public services available elsewhere in the nation. E -12 in the provinces, yet it is the federal government that has greater access to the fiscal resources necessary to accomplish programmatic objectives (Simeon 1972: 146-147 ).
Consequently, in many cases if nationally significant goals are to be accomplished, subnational power must be yoked to national funding, a task requiring intergovernmental cooperation on a broad scale.
One additional area deserves mention: the extraordinarily complex provisions for amending the constitution, a highly contentious issue in Canadian constitutional politics.
Under the Constitution Act, 1982, the general amending rule requires that any amendment proposed by Parliament be ratified by 'at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate, . . . at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.' VI This is known colloquially as the 'seven-fifty formula' because it requires the approval of seven of the ten provinces having more than fifty percent of the population. Its significance, however, lies in the way it avoids giving any province a veto while at the same time ensuring that all amendments enjoy broad regional support. First, any group of seven provinces necessarily must include at least one of the four Western provinces and at least one of the four Atlantic provinces, all but eliminating the risk of outright regional exploitation. Second, the fifty-percent population threshold requires either Ontario or Quebec to be among the ratifying provinces, guaranteeing support by at least one of the major centers of wealth and population.
Complicating matters, however, is a provision that permits provinces to opt out of constitutional amendments enacted by this method: 'An amendment . . . shall not have effect in a province the legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution supported by a majority its members. . . .' VII The constitutional amending rules also provide that amendments relating to a small number of issues may be enacted only by unanimous approval of the provinces, and that an amendment applying to fewer than all provinces must be approved by the legislatures of those provinces to which it applies.
These rules on their face establish the basis for an unusual constitutional regime of asymmetrical application. On the other hand, to the extent that non-uniform application of constitutional rules is seen by national majority coalitions as something to be avoidedgenerally the case outside of Quebec -the amendment rules create incentives to change the constitution by means other than formal amendment, a topic to which we shall return shortly.
Canadian federalism in practice
As Gerald Baier (2012: 79), among many others, has observed, 'Canada's federal system features a rather large gap between the jurisdictional map of the written constitution and the actual activities of its governments.' It is therefore essential to describe some of the important informal institutions that have arisen on the constitutional landscape. I shall mention three: constitutional conventions, responsible government, and executive federalism.
Like the British constitution that served to a great extent as its model, the Canadian Constitution is found not only in written legal texts but also in conventions of official This provision, by its incontrovertible language, gives the Governor General a power to veto federal legislation, yet by longstanding convention that power is never exercised.
The Governor General's assent to federal legislation is still required for its validity, and such consent is routinely given, but it is given on the advice of the Prime Minister and By far the most important and wide-ranging constitutional convention, however, is the convention establishing 'responsible government.' Responsible government refers to the British or 'Westminster' system of parliamentary government, which Canadians have adopted. In that system, executive power is exercised not by its formal holder, the Queen, but by the Prime Minister, who is selected by the majority party or party coalition in Parliament, and his or her cabinet. The government is 'responsible' in the sense that the executive is answerable to, and must have the continuing support of, the Parliament. The system of responsible government was similarly adopted in each of the Canadian provinces, where the head of the dominant legislative party and first minister is known as the Premier. 
Tools and methods of subnational influence
Having reviewed the main structures and institutions of Canadian federalism, we are now in a position to examine the concrete methods by which subnational units in Canada influence national policy and get what they want from the national government. In brief, due to the institutionalization of executive federalism, by far the most common method to which Canadian provinces resort to get their way is negotiation. So dominant is negotiation as a mode of intergovernmental relations that it establishes a baseline against which all other modes are conventionally perceived in most of Canada as derogations. I describe two of these below: unilateral action and the making of threats, including the threat of secession. The subsection concludes with a brief examination of modes of subnational influence that are used widely in other federal states, but play a much smaller role in Canada: exploitation of political party channels, mobilization of popular political opinion, and constitutional litigation.
Negotiation and deal-making
The emergence of executive federalism in Canada has produced a system in which 
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Another important example of multilateral negotiation is the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA). Reached in 1999, the SUFA agreement established a collaborative framework among the federal government and all of the provinces except Quebec -which did not in the end join the agreement -to develop and structure social programs on a basis of equality, respect for human rights, and geographical uniformity of access to social programs and services, and committed the governments to the elimination of barriers to mobility arising from residency requirements for social programs, and various other measures. Rather than concluding the issue, however, the judicial ruling became the point of departure for lengthy intergovernmental negotiations in which the provinces took the position that the judicial ruling deprived them of something that was theirs, and for which they ought to be compensated (Feehan 2009: 176-177 ).
This was enough to bring the federal government to the table, and under the eventual agreements, an Offshore Petroleum Board was established as a joint federal-provincial agency to manage development of the oil resources. Provincial taxation was permitted as though the resources were provincially owned, so that the provinces were able to raise revenue from both royalties and corporate taxation. At the same time, the federal equalization formula was adjusted in favor of the two provinces. Normally, the receipt by a province of unanticipated revenue would result in an offset, or 'clawback,' of equalization payments by the federal government. Newfoundland and Labrador, and later Nova Scotia, received reprieves from operation of the clawback principle for periods of twelve and ten years, respectively (Feehan 2009: 177-183) . Subsequently, complaints by other provinces, loud politicking by Newfoundland and Labrador, and changes in federal administrations, led to repeated renegotiations of the deal in the ensuing years.
Bilateral intergovernmental deal-making does not always occur in the context of issues of concern solely to specific provinces; it also can be embedded in more comprehensive negotiations among all the governments over programs intended to have nationwide reach.
In particular, in order to reach agreements of comprehensive scope, the federal government will sometimes cut side deals with individual provinces to secure their agreement to the broader programmatic framework. Having reviewed in some depth the baseline method by which Canadian subnational units influence national political affairs, I turn to some other tools that Canadian provinces sometimes deploy to achieve their objectives.
Ignoring the federal government
Notwithstanding the dominant norm of mutual consultation and negotiation, Canadian provinces sometimes get their way simply by ignoring the federal government altogether and pursuing provincial goals directly, through the direct and unmediated exercise of provincial power. This is to some extent more possible in Canada than in other federal states on account of the large measure of power constitutionally allocated to the provinces. Nevertheless, consistent with Canadian norms of consultation and negotiation, they simultaneously invited the provinces to take a more active role in formulating foreign policy in areas related to their constitutional authority.
Quebec, however, pushed this principle further than Ottawa could tolerate. In 1968, Gabon invited Quebec's minister of education to an international conference of francophone nations, without consulting or notifying Ottawa. Federal officials rebuked both Quebec and Gabon, but when the same behavior was repeated, Ottawa severed diplomatic relations with Gabon in retaliation (Mahler 1994). Quebec's entrepreneurialism, however, eventually yielded a settlement it found acceptable: foreign policy in some areas was thereafter conducted on a cooperative basis, and the federal government agreed to permit Quebec to become directly and officially involved on its own account in some international organizations. Given the ways in which the Canadian constitutional system is capable, in time, of transmuting practice to constitutionally entrenched convention, a degree of power entrepreneurism at the provincial level seems understandable.
A final way in which provinces act by ignoring the federal government is to exclude it from interprovincial negotiations. In 2003, the premiers of the ten provinces and the territories formed the Council of the Federation (COF), an organization similar to the more established First Ministers Conference, but without the presence of the federal government (Simeon and Nugent 2012: 67) . Motivated in part by a growing feeling that recent federal administrations were not acting in a sufficiently consultative manner, the premiers organized themselves, in their own words, 'because they believe it is important for provinces and territories to play a leadership role in revitalizing the Canadian federation and building a more constructive and cooperative federal system.' XVI Thus, the COF coordinates provincial policy on matters in which federal involvement is not needed, and attempts to develop consensus positions among the provinces to enable them to present a united front in collective negotiations with Ottawa.
Threats
The making of threats is the polar opposite of the Canadian default preference for intergovernmental consultation and negotiation, yet provinces have from time to time . frequent recourse to the courts is sometimes seen as an indicator of breakdown of these more consensual, administrative mechanisms' (Simeon 2000: 148) . Consequently, intergovernmental agreements of the kind described earlier have largely eclipsed the courts as the institutional vehicle for assigning power (Baier 2012: 86-91) .
Conclusions: The Impact of Constitutional Design on Federal Stability
Unlike subnational units in many federal states, Canadian provinces have ready access to extremely powerful tools to influence national policy and actions, including negotiated alteration of the federal constitution itself. As a result, they do not need to resort to improvised weaker tools, as is often the case elsewhere (Gardner 2005: 87-98; Gardner and Abad 2011). The availability of such tools makes Canadian provinces potentially extremely effective advocates of provincial interests in the arena of national policy making.
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Nevertheless, this provincial effectiveness may come at a price to the extent that it results from what might be called the 'hyperplasticity' of the Canadian Constitution's allocations of federal and provincial power.
By hyperplasticity in this context, I mean that the capacity of provinces to elevate policy disputes with Ottawa to the level of constitutional disputes -to convert negotiations over policy into negotiations over the constitutional allocation of national and provincial powers -seems to create an incentive structure in which governments have significant incentives to raise the stakes in every negotiation. In this environment, policy disagreements between the provincial and federal government carry inherently the potential to serve as an opening for constitutional dispute, and the constitution therefore need not be seen by the players as establishing a set of binding institutional structures and constraints within which other decisions are taken. Instead, governments engaged in conflict may be tempted to view the constitution as provisional and subject to renegotiation whenever it seems to offer them a losing position. If you are going to lose in a policy dispute conducted according to a particular set of rules, why accept the rules if they can be changed mid-negotiation? If the constitution allocates a power to the national level and the national government will not exercise that power in a way congenial to a province, why should a province hold out for its policy preference when it can instead press for a reallocation of the power in question to the provincial level? In these circumstances, the practice of intergovernmental relations has a distinct tendency to collapse into pure, unconstrained politics. XXII Constitutional flexibility, of course, has its benefits; the ability of Canadian governments to negotiate their way past constitutional obstacles has 'on many occasions . . . allowed constitutional rigidities to be circumvented' 'what is striking with Canadian federalism is that we try to govern this country without the assistance of a legal framework, i.e., the Constitution. … That we should constantly be negotiating is perhaps normal; that there should be no permanent agreed-upon rules to govern our negotiations and what we negotiate is more troublesome. But this is what a constitution is meant to provide: a set of fundamental rules or a framework within which the day-to-day political process can take place. Lack of agreement on day-to-day political issues is normal and healthy. Lack of agreement on the fundamental rules is a different matter.
In fact, one could say that in our federation, because of this lack of agreed-upon fundamental rules, the management of what should be day-to-day political issues has a tendency to mutate into quasiconstitutional negotiations, with the ironical result that Canada, for wanting to avoid its constitution, finds itself locked in a state of permanent constitutional debate' (Adam 2009: 297-298 Gardner and Abad (2011: 508-509) . XIX Chhibber and Kollman (2004) attribute this to the strong decentralization of power in the system, i.e., because the provinces have such significant responsibility, voters have incentives to vote their policy preferences at the provincial level; whereas in more centralized systems they have incentives to vote their national preferences in subnational elections. XX Such tactics are used effectively elsewhere -in Spain, for example. Gardner and Abad (2011: 509-510) . Cf., however, Wright (2016: 29) , claiming that 'Public criticism of federal initiatives by the provinces is a staple of intergovernmental politics in Canada.' Wright later goes on to cast doubt on the efficacy of this tactic as a means by which provinces might discipline the national government (36-44). XXI Swinton (1990: 10-20) describes the court's decisions as only an early move in what is often a series of strategic actions by provincial governments. Ryder (2006: 353) similarly describes 'a familiar pattern in Canadian federalism' in which an initial victory in court by the central government is followed by the losing province being 'accommodated politically through intergovernmental negotiations.' Scholars, moreover, seem to agree that the Supreme Court has in recent years backed away from an aggressive form of judicial review of structural issues, preferring instead to let the political branches work out their disagreements through negotiations (Wright 2010; Ryder 2006; Brouillet 2006) . XXII Choudhry (2003: 82) argues that the 'site for the evolution of the legal framework governing social policy has been in politics. The politics of social policy, in other words, has been an arena for constitutional politics.'
